Simulation Study on Evolutionary Game Model between Technological Small and Medium Enterprises and Banks under Verification System

Authors

  • Huafeng Chen Guizhou University of Finance and Economics
  • Mu Zhang Guizhou University of Finance and Economics
  • Junmeng Lu Guizhou University of Finance and Economics

Keywords:

Evolutionary Game Model, Technological Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs), Risk Compensation Funds, Verification System

Abstract

On the basis of evolutionary game theory, this paper adds risk compensation funds and establishes an evolutionary game model for Technological Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) and bank loans under the verification mechanism. And the stability analysis and simulation study of the game results of the four evolutionary strategies of the model are carried out. Finally, we have put forward some suggestions on the strategy selection and the development of the loan system.

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Published

2021-10-15

How to Cite

Huafeng Chen, Mu Zhang, & Junmeng Lu. (2021). Simulation Study on Evolutionary Game Model between Technological Small and Medium Enterprises and Banks under Verification System. Journal of Risk Analysis and Crisis Response, 8(2). Retrieved from https://jracr.com/index.php/jracr/article/view/239

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